

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Handle via []
Control System Only

COMOR-D-25/18

25 February 1963

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
SUBJECT: Justification for Aerial
Reconnaissance of Laos

25X1A

1. At the COMOR meeting on 19 February 1963, it was agreed that the DIA paper on the above subject [] of 18 February should be redrafted for submission to higher authority in order to get coverage of Laos. [] offered to do this redrafting in the course of which he said he wished to get the views of CIA.

25X1A

2. The attached redraft is submitted for approval by the COMOR at the meeting on Thursday, 28 February. The members are also requested to advise at that time whether this paper should be submitted for approval of the USIB.

[]

25X1A

James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

25X1A

Copy 2, 3--State TCO
4--DIA []
5, 6, 7, 8--DIA TCO
9--OACSI TCO
10--ONI TCO
11, 12--AFNIN TCO
13, 14--NSA TCO
15, 16--NRO TCO

GROUP I--Excluded from
automatic downgrading and
declassification

25X1A

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Handle via [] Control

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Handle via [redacted]
Control System Only

COMOR-D-25/18

Justification for Aerial Reconnaissance of Laos

1. The political situation in Laos has been steadily deteriorating for several months. In view of the continuing isolation of the neutralist forces by the Pathet Lao, hostilities may soon be resumed, and special urgency, therefore, attaches to the acquisition of reliable intelligence relating to the buildup of Communist capabilities in the area.

2. Various reports indicate not only the presence of Chinese Communist forces in Northwestern Laos along the Sino-Lao border area but also extensive road construction into Phong Saly and Nam Tha Provinces continuing west toward the Thai border.

3. Apart from the Chinese Communist activity in the northwest, reconnaissance is necessary to provide intelligence on North Vietnamese activities in Laos. This will require coverage of targets in the Plaine des Jarres and the Tchepone area. The latter is particularly important as a support base for Communist operations in lower Laos and into South Vietnam.

4. [redacted] reconnaissance missions over Laos terminated last summer. It is urged, therefore, that in order to collect some of the information so urgently needed on both Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese activities U-2 coverage be authorized. In this respect, the present COMOR list of objectives includes the areas of concern.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

TOP SECRET

Handle via [redacted]
Control System Only

TOP SECRET

25X1A

Handle via [redacted]
Control System Only

COMOR-D-25/18

Copy 1--DCI TCO
17--DCI TCO for USIB/S
18, 19--Asst/OPS(NPIC)
20--C/PSD(NPIC)
21--C/PID(NPIC)
22--C/CSD(NPIC)
23--LS/PID(NPIC)
24--TSO CIA
25--DDI TCO
26--OCI TCO
27, 28--OSI TCO
29--ORR TCO
30--DDP TCO
31--DDR TCO
32--AD/OSA
33--OD/OSA
34--Intel/OSA
35--SO/OSA
36-38--SA/DDR
39--RB/OSA

25X1A

[redacted]
Handle via [redacted]
Control System Only

25X1A

TOP SECRET